
Where will Europe's new mojo come from?

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In a recent column for EUobserver, I wrote that Europe could easily become the big geopolitical loser of the Corona pandemic.
The resonance of the piece was strong, and it didn't come without a lot of well-intentioned suggestions.
Many of these suggestions were not only well intentioned, but also well repeated:
Europe should finally act as a whole, restart the Franco-German engine, build a central Europe, strengthen economic governance, create a political union, reform the euro, move closer to the United States, distance itself from the United States, embracing equidistance between China. and the United States, be tougher with Russia, be softer with Russia, complete the single market, control capitalism, save the WTO, be more protectionist, launch the new green deal, focus on Orban, focus on Africa, focus on Ukraine, focus on the Balkans, focus on Erdogan, remember the refugees, fight fascism, adopt a new Marshall plan, adopt a new Schuman plan, open borders, close borders, intervene in Libya, look at Iran, be more resilient with regard to the economy, health, defense, social cohesion, climate change and democracy. He also needed to spend more on education and research to become a leader in IT, AI and virtual reality.
And, of course, he also needed to beat the nation state, that classic adage of well-intentioned good intention after any crisis.
Everyone suggests what they always suggest, and everything is as generally correct as it is largely out of reach. It is easy to reject suggestions that are always similar to the European debate as outdated, ritualistic and ridiculous.
However, we have reached a point in European discourse where the repetitiveness of the debate is no longer the main problem. The main problem is that, although we have agreed on the way forward, we have no idea how to proceed.
Where is the source of energy in Europe for the political upheaval that will have to be done so that this continent emerges intact from the multiplicity of crises that afflict it?
These days, it doesn't matter if you are in favor of a European army or a stronger national army or disarmament.
There is not enough juice in the system for all of this.
The same goes for many heated political debates on the right path to follow in the euro, at the borders, in China, in social Europe or in the area of migration.
Empty tank
The problem is: no matter if you turn left or right, your fuel tank is empty anyway.
Where is the secret well from which Europe can advance the big tasks ahead? Who can generate energy at a level capable of moving this exhausted continent? Will they be voters? Leaders? Youth? The elite? The business community? EU institutions? Populists? Artists? Officials? Some protestors? Churches? Popular? Lobbyists? Experts? Rich philanthropists? Workers? Will imagination, vision and desire for a better future unleash the potential? Or history and memory? Or anger? Or will it be fear and pain, external shocks, recession and war?
Until recently, there was a tacit confidence that Europe would always have one more turn in its repertoire, if need be. It was always clear that progress would never be easy and compromises were made with effort. But it was also clear that the horse could jump high enough to deal with the situation.
Somewhere between the lost constitutional referendums of 2005 and the coronavirus of 2020, that confidence is dead.
In the post-2008 financial crisis, Europeans pulled a rabbit from the hat once again, but the last act of saving did not come from politicians but from the European Central Bank . Politicians simply no longer had the strength to comply.
This paralysis is partly due to the fact that integration is much more difficult to achieve in the policy areas that matter today, as opposed to those that were integrated first.
Partly due to the fact that there are no longer dominant parties that get 44% of the vote and create momentum towards results.
Europe is today the continent of the strong party of 15-20%, which means that a large part of the energy is absorbed simply by bringing together coalitions and stable majorities.
In many ways, European integration has been a good time so far. The disputes were difficult, but the stakes were only medium-high.
From now on, the problems become existential for our democracy, our economic prosperity, our social peace and our international security. As a result, what was once considered a deep level of integration is now half seen.
True cooperation in these existential areas must be much deeper to have meaning. You will have to spend a lot more political capital and also a lot more money. All this at a time when political capital is small and pockets are empty.
The standard answer for realists will be: there will be no giant jumps, just an infinite number of small incremental steps. The problem with this answer is that in big problems, even small steps are important. Even small progress requires transfers of sovereignty of an unknown type until then.
In addition, there is little time for prolonged incrementalism. The geopolitical clock of Europe is turning, everything around us is changing faster and more radically than we can absorb or react to it, not to mention being ahead.
Where will Europe's heavy energy come from?
Anyone who suggests a great plan that would surely save Europe must first answer this question. Show us the money! Or at least show us how to get there. This is the real European question of our time.