May 8, 2020 marked the second anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from the Common Global Action Plan (JCPOA), or the Iranian Nuclear Agreement, and the reimposition of all U.S. sanctions that had been lifted in concert with the treaty. It is a well-founded and globally recognized fact that the United States is no longer a participant in the JCPOA, and I do not intend to discuss the evidence here. Instead, I would like to analyze the idea of balance, which is the lifeblood for successful implementation, or in the present circumstances, the survival of JCPOA.
From a textual point of view, this balance is between Iran's nuclear commitments and its enjoyment of its economic benefits. It is essentially a fairly legal version of the idea of "balance" in the nuclear deal and fails to capture the overall goal and ambitions as they are perceived by the agreement. The JCPOA is not limited to what one perceives closely when reading its meticulously designed text.
To better understand the current situation, we must consider the nuclear deal in its broader political, security and economic context. JCPOA was only a means to an end, not an end in itself. From an economic and security perspective, the JCPOA is ready to produce most of its positive results on multiple and bilateral fronts. In other words, in exchange for temporary and voluntary measures taken by Iran beyond its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement, all international restrictions and restrictions against Iran, including, inter alia, the automatic lifting of the arms embargo on October 18, 2020 – will end on schedule.
On the economic front, the agreement was conceived as a path towards the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran. In this context, the idea of balance is linked to the status quo of 2012, when the EU was Iran's largest trading partner.
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The year 2012 marked a change in the EU's approach to Iran in terms of sanctions, with Iranian oil and the Central Bank being added to the list to which EU restrictive measures now apply. From 2012 to 2015, Iran's trade with the EU fell sharply from the 2011 record to the lowest point in 2013-2015, and now at a record level in 2019. Although 2017 offered a snapshot of the status quo before the previously, the sanctions could not maintain the good trend and openness created by the implementation of the JCPOA. The uncertainty created by the new administration in the United States and its year-long campaign to exasperate Iran until its exit from the agreement has killed the atmosphere constructive approach in which the JCPOA could have been successfully implemented.
In a sense, until May 8, 2019, when Iran announced its phased reversible plan to partially honor its nuclear commitments after a year of patience, the narrowly defined textual balance had been fully maintained and technically verified. by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On a broader level, however, Iran was losing its economic benefits because the landscape offered no positive signs regarding the promised normalization of trade and economic relations. From a strictly JCPOA point of view, this meant that normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran remained elusive, becoming a distant and unattainable goal. The short period following the day of implementation, from January 16, 2016 to 2018, indicated the huge economic benefits for the EU, as it almost succeeded in achieving its exports before the sanctions to the EU ;Iran. For the EU, the political, security and economic functions of the JCPOA were in perfect condition.
The economic benefits were what was perceived from the bilateral aspects of the sanctions lifting the JCPOA commitments. Iran's official statements that it has shown strategic restraint for a full year (2018 to 2019) should be viewed from this perspective. This means that Iran made the fateful decision to unilaterally comply, thus maintaining the textual balance of the agreement, despite its diminishing economic value which saw 2019 become the worst trading period between Iran and the EU. Any achievement of textual balance would depend on the restoration of contextual balance; In other words, any expectation from Iran to restore the status quo before May 2019 goes hand in hand with greater benefits from implementing the JCPOA at the political and economic levels.
Another important integral element for the successful implementation of the JCPOA is the more nuanced political benefits that will flow from the lifting of the UN sanctions, i.e. the multilateral aspects of the agreement. According to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), a batch of United Nations arms embargoes against Iran will automatically expire on October 18, 2020. Although it will does not keep the promises of JCPOA, it nevertheless injects an appearance of balance. in agreement.
Entangled in mistaken logic, the new U.S. attack on the JCPOA, if it materializes, can hopelessly unbalance the deal. On the economic, political and security fronts, the EU may have been one of the main winners of the JCPOA. The nuclear deal is an important achievement of EU foreign policy, and I am led to believe that the EU, in particular the EU triumvirate, is in good shape position to maintain the fragile balance existing on the multiple and bilateral front in opposing the last United States. offensive against the JCPOA, as well as restoring balance on the economic front, thereby relaunching the dying nuclear deal.
Hossein Dehghani is the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Belgium and the European Union.
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